The SARG04 protocol is one of the most frequently used protocol in commercial plug-and-play quantum key distribution (QKD) system, where an eavesdropper can completely control or change the photon number statistics of the QKD source. To ensure the security of SARG04 protocol in plug-and-play QKD system with an unknown and untrusted source, the bounds of a few statistical parameters of the source need to be monitored. An active or a passive source monitor schemes are proposed to verify these parameters. Furthermore, the practical issues due to statistical fluctuation and detection noise in the source monitoring process are quantitatively analyzed. Our simulation results show that the passive scheme can be efficiently applied to plug-and-play system with SARG04 protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a means of sharing a secret key between two parties (Alice and Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). The single-photon (e.g. BB84 [1] and SARG04 [2] ), entanglement-based (e.g. E91 [3] ) and continuous variable (e.g. GG02 [4] ) QKD protocols have proved to be unconditionally secure under ideal (source, channel, detection and postprocessing) assumptions [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . In practical QKD systems, the security assumptions are not completely satisfied and security loopholes exist [13] . Real implementations of QKD may deviate from the ideal models in security proofs, such as laser with intensity fluctuation [14, 15] , detectors with mismatched detection efficiency [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] , or detection blinding [22] [23] [24] . The unconditional security of practical QKD systems will be compromised if these loopholes are not included in general security analysis or no counter measures are made. For instance, the ideal security proof for the BB84 protocol was given when a single-photon source was assumed [6] , while highly attenuated laser source is often used in real experiment, where the source sometimes produces multi-photon states. Due to the channel loss and these multi-photon states, Eve can perform the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [25] . Lately, more general security analysis for the BB84 protocol with weak coherent laser source and semi-realistic models were given [7, 8] . Furthermore, several methods (such as decoy state [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] and SARG04 [2] protocols) have been proposed to fight against the multi-photon loophole.
The security loophole considered in this paper is the untrusted source problem [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] . In the standard security analysis of some protocols (such as BB84, decoy state, and SARG04 protocols), the photon number distribution (PND) of the QKD source is assumed to be fixed and known to Alice * xiangpeng@pku.edu.cn. † hongguo@pku.edu.cn.
and Bob, which is defined as a trusted source. However, in a one-way QKD system, the intensity fluctuation from the laser source and the parameter fluctuation from the optical devices cause the assumption of the trusted source to fail [14, 15, 42] . More seriously in a two-way plug-and-play QKD system, Eve can even control or change the PND of the QKD source in principle, such that the source is unknown and untrusted [35] . To solve the untrusted source problem, the statistical characteristics of the QKD source need to be monitored in real experiment [36] . Many theoretical researches have been done on the security analysis for BB84 and decoy state protocols with an untrusted source [35, [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] 43] , and the real-time source monitoring for both one-way and two-way systems have been demonstrated experimentally [36, 37, 42] .
As is pointed out in [5] , the SARG04 protocol is more robust than BB84 against the PNS attack, and has been applied in commercial plug-and-play QKD system [44] . However, this protocol also suffer from the untrusted-source problem. In this paper, rigorous security analysis for the SARG04 protocol with an untrusted source is given, and the lower bound of secure key rate is devised if the ranges of a few statistical parameters of the untrusted source are known. Then, an active and a passive schemes are proposed to monitor these parameters. Furthermore, the practical issues of finite data size and detection noise are quantitatively analyzed.
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR THE SARG04 PROTOCOL WITH AN UNTRUSTED SOURCE
The security key rate of the SARG04 protocol is [9] 
where Q µ and E µ are the total count rate and quantum bit error rate (QBER) respectively, Q 1(2) is the gain of the 1(2)-photon state, Z 1(2) and X 1 (2) are random variables characterizing the phase and bit errors for the 1(2)-photon state respectively, f (
is the error correction efficiency, and
is the Shannon entropy function. Suppose p X1 (2) denote the probability that bit flip without phase flip occurs on 1(2)-photon state, p Z1 (2) denote the probability that phase flip without bit flip occurs on 1(2)-photon state, and p Y1 (2) denote the probability that both bit flip and phase flip occur on 1(2)-photon state. Let e i (e pi ) denote the bit (phase) error rate for i-photon state, and e 1(2) = p X1 (2) +p Y1 (2) , e p1(2) = p Z1 (2) +p Y1 (2) . It has been proved for one-way postprocessing that [9] ,
where 
In order to calculate the final secure key rate, one needs a good estimation of Q 1 (2) and e 1 (2) . There are a few methods to approach the target. One is proposed by GLLP [8] , where all the losses and errors are assumed from the 1-photon and 2-photon states, and Q 1 (2) and e 1(2) are overestimated. Another is the decoy state method [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] , which can accurately estimate the parameters. Here, we consider the SARG04 protocol combined with decoy state method. A fundamental assumption in the decoy state protocol with a trusted source is e n = e [26] , where Y n is the yield of n-photon state and the superscript s(d) means the signal (decoy) source. The optimal estimation, with applying infinite decoy states, converges to [9] ,
where η n is the probability for n-photon state to arrive at Bob's detector, Y 0 is the dark count rate of Bob's detector, and e det is the probability that a photon hit the erroneous detector in Bob's side. Then, one has Q 1(2) = P 1(2) Y 1 (2) , where P 1(2) is the probability for Alice to send out 1(2)-photon state that is fixed and known to Alice and Bob with a trusted source.
In the untrusted source case, the assumptions of e [34, 35] , and the results in Eq. (4) no longer hold. One needs new methods to estimate Q 1 (2) , which has been an open question. Fortunately, the results in [35, 39] provide two new ways to estimate the lower bound of Q 1 for BB84 protocol combined with 3-intensity decoy state methods. However, in SARG04 protocol, both 1-photon and 2-photon states have positive contributions to the secure key rate. Thus, the main task for the SARG04 protocol with an untrusted source is to derive the lower bound of Q 2 . We find a modification of the method in [39] will approach this task. In the following, the lower bound of Q 2 is calculated for the SARG04 protocol combined with 4-intensity decoy state method in untrusted source scheme.
In a SARG04 protocol combined with 4-intensity decoy state method, Alice randomly sends four kinds of sources: vacuum, decoy-1, decoy-2 and signal source, with probability p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , and p ′ , respectively. In the trusted source scheme, the source is controlled completely by Alice, and the quantum states of vacuum, decoy-1, decoy-2 and signal sources are expected to be ρ 0 = |0 0|, ρ 1 = ∞ n=0 a n |n n|,
where {a ′ n , a n , b n } are fixed and known. In the untrusted source scheme, the source is controlled and prepared by Eve (as shown in Fig. 1(a) ), and {a ′ n , a n , b n } are unknown. Suppose Alice sends M optical pulses to Bob totally. In a real experiment, one could observe the following parameters: N s , N d1 (2) , and N 0 (the number of counts caused by signal, decoy-1(2), and vacuum sources, respectively). Then the count rates for signal, decoy-1(2), and vacuum sources are
One can rigorously prove that (see Appendix A for details)
and
When one consider the contribution from only 1-photon state for the SARG04 protocol, the final secure key rate is
2 } need to be verified to estimate the gain of 1-photon state in Eq. (5), after which one has e 1 ≤ E µ Q µ /Q 1 . Then one can calculate the secure key rate as Eq. (10). This case is defined as Case-1. When one consider the contributions from both 1-photon and 2-photon states, the parameters {a
L , a U 3 } need to be verified to estimate the gains of 1-photon and 2-photon states as in Eqs. (5) and (7). Then one can numerically choose the optimal values e 1 and e 2 under constrain Q µ E µ ≥ Q 1 e 1 + Q 2 e 2 to lower bound the secure key rate in Eq. (3). This case is defined as Case-2. Note that the conditions in Eq. (6) for case-1 and in Eqs. (8) and (9) for case-2 need to be verified experimentally. In the following, we propose an active and a passive source monitors to estimate these statistical parameters experimentally.
III. ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SOURCE MONITORS
The schematic diagram of a QKD system with an untrusted source is shown in Fig. 1(a) , where the source is assumed to be completely controlled and prepared by Eve. A source monitor is used to verify the statistical characteristics of the untrusted source in Alice's side. At least two schemes can realize the source monitor: an active scheme shown in Fig. 1 (b) [35] , and a passive scheme shown in Fig. 1 (c) [36] [37] [38] . Suppose that P 1 (n) is the PND of the untrusted source at P1 (Pi means position i in Fig. 1 ), and P 3 (m, η) is the PND at P3 given that the attenuation coefficient of the VOA is η. Then one has [36] 
where η ′ = η for active scheme and η ′ = η × η BS for passive scheme. Due to the definition of {a (12) A full security analysis procedure can be divided in to four steps. Step1: Estimate the bounded statistical parameters of the untrusted source based on the experimental measurement results. Step2: Verify the conditions shown in Eqs. (8) and (9) . Step3: Calculate the lower bound of Q 1 and Q 2 based on Eqs. (5) and (7). Step4: Estimate the final secure key rate.
A. Active Source Monitor
In the active source monitor shown in Fig. 1(b) , one half of the optical pulses are randomly sent to a photon-numberresolving (PNR) detector for parameters estimation, and the other half are sent to Bob for key generation [35] . For simplification, the PNR detector is assumed to be noiseless and the detection efficiency is 1. Clearly, where D(m, η) is the probability that m photoelectrons are recorded by the PNR detector given that the attenuation coefficient of the VOA is η. Combining the results in Eqs. (12) and (13), a (6), (8) , and (9), and calculate the final secure key rate.
B. Passive Source Monitor
As pointed out in [36, 37] , it is challenging and inefficient to implement the active scheme. Then, a practical passive scheme is proposed and tested experimentally [36] . In the passive source monitor shown in Fig. 1(c) , optical pulses are separated into two parts by a beam splitter (BS) with transmittance η BS : one goes to a PNR detector with efficiency η D , and the other is sent out of Alice's side. For simplification, one set
Then the PND at P3 is the same to that at P5,
If the PNR detector is noiseless, the detected photoelectron distribution F(m, η) at P5 will be the same to P 5 (m, η),
Based on Eqs. (12), (15) and (16), one can bound the parameters {a ′ m , a m , b m } with the knowledge of F(m, η). In a real system, one needs to consider the practical imperfections of the source monitor. In the following, the effects of statistical fluctuation and detection noise are quantitatively analyzed.
Infinite Data Size and Noiseless Source Monitor
Suppose that M is the total number of optical pulses sent from Alice to Bob, while p
, and p 2 M = (M 2 ) is the number of signal, decoy-1, and decoy-2 pulses, correspondingly.
Step1. When the data size M → ∞, one has a
Step2. The conditions in Eqs. (8) and (9) turn to
Step3. In case-1, the gain of 1-photon state is calculated by Eq. (5) based on the recorded data F(m, η), and all the errors are assumed from 1-photon state e 1 = E µ Q µ /Q 1 . In case-2, the gains of 1-photon and 2-photon states are calculated by Eqs. (5) and (7) based on the recorded data F(m, η), and e 1 (2) are chosen numerically to lower bound the secure key rate.
Step4. Calculate the secure key rate for case-1 and case-2 with Eqs. (10) and (3), respectively.
For testing the efficiency of the passive scheme, the simulation results for the trusted source are compared with that for the untrusted source (shown in Fig. 2) , while the data size is infinite. The PND for the trusted and the untrusted source is assumed to be of Poissonian statistics to perform simulations. The error correction efficiency f (E µ ) = 1.22. The transmittance η BS of the BS is 0.13 and the detection efficiency η D of the PNR detector is 0.15. The other experimental parameters are cited from the GYS experiment [45] as shown in Table I , where η Bob is the efficiency of Bob's detection, e 0 is the probability that a dark count hit the erroneous detector in Bob's side. Suppose the average photon number (APN) for signal, decoy-1 and decoy-2 sources are µ, v 1 and v 2 , respectively. The conditions in Eqs. (8) and (9) turn to
As shown in Fig. 2 , the performance of the untrusted source based on the passive source monitor is very close to that of the trusted source, and the 2-photon state makes positive contribution to the secure key rate. Simulation results of the SARG04 protocol for the trusted source, compared with the untrusted source in both case-1 and case-2 when the data size is infinite. In the trusted source case, infinite decoy state method is used to estimate the values of Q 1 , Q 2 , e 1 , e 2 as in Eq. (4). The top (red) line is the simulation results for the trusted source, where one considers the contribution from both 1-photon and 2-photon states. The second (yellow) line is the simulation results for the untrusted source in case-2. The third (blue) line is the simulation results for the trusted source, where one considers the contribution from only 1-photon state. The bottom (green) line is the simulation results for the untrusted source in case-1. In all the simulations, the PND for both trusted and untrusted source is assumed to be of Poissonian statistics.
Finite Data Size and Noiseless Source Monitor
Suppose that the data size M is finite. Let j (2) ] with a confidence level 1 − 2 exp(−M 1 (2)ε 2 1(2) /2) for decoy-1(2) pulses can be estimated. Simultaneously, 6 exp(−M 2 ε 2 2 /2). From Eqs. (12) and (16), one gets
for m = 0, 1, 2, · · · , J and n = 0, 1, 2 with confidence level α.
Step2. It is challenging to verify directly the condition in Eq. (8) (8) as
where the PNR detector is only required to discriminate photon number n = 0, 1, · · · , J (see Appendix B for details). The condition in Eq. (9) turns to
Step3. If the conditions in step2 are satisfied, one can lower bound the parameters Q 1 and Q 2 .
For testing the effects of finite data size, we choose an untrusted source of Poissonian statistics to perform simulations in both case-1 and case-2. The error correction efficiency f (E µ ) are chosen to be 1.22. The other experimental parameters are cited from Table I . Simulation results for case-2 and case-1 are shown in Fig. 3(a) and (b) , and the data size are set to be M = ∞, 10 12 , 10 11 , 10 10 and 10 9 , respectively. To compare the two cases more clearly, Fig. 4 shows the simulation results for case-1 and case-2 with M = 10 12 and 10 11 , respectively. In all the above simulations, the confidence level is set to be α = 1 − 10 −6 . The simulation results show that statistical fluctuation has negative effect on performance of the QKD system. When the data size is large enough, the 2-photon state has positive contribution to the secure key rate.
Finite Data Size and Source Monitor with Random Additive Detection Noise
Given a PNR detector with an independent additive detection noise y, the detected photoelectron number m ′ , and the photon number m at P5 satisfy m ′ = m + y. One can calculate the lower and upper bound of PND P 5 (m, η) at P5 based on the photoelectron distribution F(m, η) with a high confidence level, given that the distribution of the detection noise N(y) is known by Alice.
The dark count is the main kind of detection noise for the PNR detector such as time multiplexing detector (TMD) [48, 49] , transition-edge sensor (TES) [50] , or a threshold detector together with a VOA [51] . In case of independent Poisson statistics noise, the probability of detecting m
! is the probability that d dark counts occur in the PNR detector, and λ is the average dark-count rate. Then, one has
Step1. Using random sampling theory [46] , simultaneously,
Our analysis is not limited to the Poissonian noise case. Generally, when the random-positive detection noise y with distribution N(y) is known to Alice, one can still use the same method in [43] to estimate the parameters {a (9) and (17) . Since the expressions of {a ′ k L , a U k } for 4 ≤ k ≤ J are much complex and trivial, we assume the above conditions are satisfied as in [36, 40] . Step3. Lower bound the parameters Q 1 and Q 2 .
For testing the effect of dark count noise, the simulation results for case-2 are shown in Fig. 5(a) , with finite data size M = 10 12 and average dark count rate λ = 0, 10 −6 , 0.5, and 1, respectively. The simulation results for case-1 are shown in Fig. 5(b) with M = 10 12 and λ = 0, 10 −6 , 1, 1.5 and 2, respectively. The confidence level is set to be α = 1 − 10 −6 .
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION REMARK
In summary, we have shown the unconditional security of the SARG04 protocol with an untrusted source, given that the bound of some key statistical parameters of the untrusted source are known by Alice and Bob. The analytical expression for the lower bound of the gain of 2-photon state is derived. Furthermore, an active and a passive source monitors are proposed to verify these parameters experimentally. Finally, we analyze the effects of the practical imperfections in the passive source monitor quantitatively, such as finite data size and additive detection noise. Asymptotically, the performance of the QKD system with an untrusted source combined with passive source monitor is very close to that of a trusted source. Our results can be directly applied to plug-and-play QKD system with SARG04 protocol.
If the ith pulse contains zero photon, the probability that it comes from the vacuum source is P vi|0 = p 0 d 0i . Therefore, the number of counts caused by vacuum source is N 0 = i∈c 0 p vi|0 = i∈c 0 p 0 d 0i . Similarly, if the ith pulse contains zero photon, the probability that it comes from the decoy-1, decoy-2 and signal source are
respectively. Then the number of counts caused by zero photon state in decoy-1, decoy-2 and signal source are n 0d1
The main result in [39] is to derive the lower bound of D 1 based on 3-intensity decoy state method (which can be seen as a special case of the 4-intensity decoy state method p 2 = 0 in this paper),
under condition
for all k ≥ 3. Further, one can lower bound the gain of 1-photon state in signal source,
as shown in Eq. (5). In the following, the lower bound of Q 2 is derived. The number of counts caused by decoy-1(2) and signal sources are
which can be rewritten as
where
and assume
for all k ≥ 4, which leads to ξ ≥ 0, one has
Combining Eqs. (A4) and (A7), one has
Since ξ 1 , ξ 3 and ξ are all non-negative, a
Then one has
Combine the results of Eqs. (A8) and (A9), one has
for all k ≥ 4 and 
, (for all 4 ≤ k ≤ J).
